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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its Road Commission, 
Pl,aintitf and Appellant, 
vs. 
GENERAL OIL COMP ANY, a Utah 
corporation, et al., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11178 
Respondent agrees with Appellant's Statement and 
adds thereto the following Statement. Upon the filing of 
the condemnation Complaint by the State, Respondent (re-
ferred to herein as the General Oil Company) admitted the 
right to condemn, public use, necessity and proper project 
design, leaving as the only issue for trial that of Just Com-
pensation to be paid for the appropriation (R. 43). No 
claim for severance damage was made by General Oil and 
the case thus proceeded to trial on the single question of 
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the fair market value of the condemned property as of 
March 19, 1964 (R. 177). 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
In this regard, the Statement by the Plaintiff in its 
Brief is incorrect. The matter was originally submitted to 
trial before the Honorable Maurice Harding, District Judge, 
sitting with a jury in February, 1967 (R. 127). From a 
verdict of $4,147.52, the property owner moved for a new 
trial and alternatively, for an additur to the verdict based 
on alleged errors of law and the legal inadequacy of the 
jury award (R. 132-134). Judge Harding granted the De-
fendant's motion by entering an additur of $10,852.48 to 
the jury verdict, conditioned upon the State's acceptance 
of the additur within 30 days; otherwise a new trial was 
ordered (R. 137). The State refused such additur award 
and thereupon petitioned this Court for interlocutory appeal 
of the new trial and additur order, on the ground that 
Judge Harding had manifestly abused his discretion and 
judgment (Supr. Ct. No. 10903). Such interlocutory Peti-
tion was by the Court denied on May 9, 1967. 
The case was set down and tried anew before the 
Honorable Leonard W. Elton, District Judge, sitting with 
a jury, in January, 1968. On the fourth day of trial, a 
verdict was returned assessing Just Compensation in the 
sum of $22,050.00 (R. 147). The State did not file a motion 
for new trial or other relief before the trial Court, but 
appealed directly from the judgment entered upon the 
verdict (R. 247). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT BY STATE ON APPEAL 
The State, by its Appeal, seeks to nullify and void the 
second trial before Judge Elton and the judgment entered 
therein, by asking that this Court enter "judgment upon 
the verdict of the jury returned in the first trial of this 
action." (App. Br. p. 2). Alternatively, the State requests 
in this Appeal a new and further trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff's fact statement, while mostly accurate, 
is quite incomplete in its account of the evidence of trial. 
Furthermore, it is apparent that the citations of Plaintiff 
to the transcript are in error as to the first trial of the 
case, since such transcript has not been designated by Plain-
tiff for inclusion in the record on appeal.1 
So that the Court may have a full digest of the facts 
upon which the new trial order was entered and of the 
relevant factors in the market at the date of condemnation, 
Defendant hereby makes its own Statement. 
1. Property Development. The condemned property of 
General Oil, consisting of 1.04 acre, was situated 
on the west side of South University Avenue at 
lAnd in fact, the transcript of the first trial before Judge Hardin_g 
has not been certified to the Court as a part of the record .. It is 
Respondent's understanding, however, that tJ:~ reported transcnpt of 
the first trial is prepared and could be certified and made. available 
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 75(h) U.R.C.P. if deemed 
material to Appellant's appeal. 
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approximately 1500 South in Provo City (R. 330, 
367, 408). Its frontage on the Avenue was some 
316 feet with full access (R. 408). When the De-
fendant purchased the property in 1957 as a potential 
service station site, the parcel lay within an agri-· 
cultural zone of the City (R. 271, 300). In 1958, as 
result of planning on the part of the State Road 
Commission and Provo City, of community meetings 
and of public hearings, it became a matter of public 
and common knowledge that Interstate Highway 15 
would be constructed and developed in the south 
Provo area on a northwest-southeast diagor.al cross-
ing South University Avenue at approximately 1700 
South (R. 239-245, 268, 269, 284), and that South 
University Avenue would serve as the main south 
access-way of Provo to and from the Freeway (R. 
250). 
2. Zoning. In 1959, in contemplation of the freeway 
coming through the south Provo area and of South 
University Avenue serving as the Interstate con-
nector street, the subject property, along with others 
having frontage on th~ west side of the A venue 
between 900 South and 1600 South, was rezoned by 
Provo City from agricultural to a special highway 
service zone, S-3 (R. 270). The zone, specially en-
acted for the property of Defendant and others 
along South University, was highly restrictive in its 
scope (R. 277-281, Ex. D-6), permissive uses under 
the ordinance being limited to service stations, motels, 
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restaurants, and other allied highway service pur-
poses. 
3. Other Developments. A further public hearing was 
held in 1961 as well as other public and private meet-
ings regarding the corridor alignment of the free-
way through south Provo and the interchange at 
South University Avenue at 1700 South (R. 267-270). 
The buying public had notice of such meetings and 
hearings and of the freeway alignment via news 
media and public maps. By 1963, actual freeway 
construction was commenced in the west Provo area 
including the development and opening of the West 
Center Street interchange (R. 257-259). At that 
time, final planning and designing of the freeway 
and the South University Avenue interchange had 
been accomplished and some freeway construction 
had actually taken place (R. 257, 542-544). As of 
March 1964, it was a matter of general information 
that the State Highway Department planned to com-
plete the freeway and interchange system at South 
University Avenue and open the same to traffic in 
the Fall of 1966.2 (R. 258, 283, 422, 542.) The fore-
going factors were received in evidence as elements 
of which the informed and prudent buyer and seller 
in .the market place would have been aware in the 
Spring of 1964, with respect to the subject property 
(R. 244, 268-269, 336-342, 416-418, 421). 
2completion and opening .o~ the freeway and interchange took place 
in November, 1966, as anticipated. (R. 543) 
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4. Condemnation. In March 1964, the property of Gen-
eral Oil was condemned not for the freeway, but for 
the widening of South University Avenue which was 
1 
to serve as the access road to the freeway (Ex. D-1). 
Sewer, water and other utilities were available to 
the property as of that date (R. 301, 408) . 
5. Highest and Best Use - Potential Commerci-OJl. 
While the actual use of the subject property and 
others in the area along South University Avenue 
was predominately agricultural, the development and 
imminency of the freeway system had for some time 
prior to 1964 provoked substantial market interest 
for commercial use (R. 304-305, 310). Prior to con-
demnation, buyers representing motel and service 
station concerns, had contacted owners along South 
University Avenue within the S-3 zone (R. 304-310), 
and several sales were thereafter made reflecting 
the commerdal value of the area (R. 287-289, 358-
360, 439-440). 
I. Dale Despain, the City Planner of Provo for 
23 years testified that in light of the S-3 zoning, . 
, ! 
the planned freeway in the area, and the demon-
strated interest for commercial development along 
South University Avenue, the highest and best use 
of the subject property as of March 1964, was po-
tential commercial (R. 285-287). The two evaluation 
witnesses for General Oil concurred in the judgment 
- that because of the zoning, market knowledge of 
the actual plans for the freeway system and the 
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interchange on South University Avenue to be con-
structed within approximately two years, and be-
cause of the intensive commercial use of the property 
along the Avenue to be reasonably expected in the 
foreseeable future, the willing and informed buyer 
and seller would be motivated to buy and sell the 
condemned property for its commercial potential as 
of the date of condemnation and in the foreseeable 
future (R. 339, 422). 
6. Landowners Value Witnesses. The experts for Gen-
eral Oil based their estimates of market value on 
commercial transactions in the immediate area, 3 a 
holding period of two years on the subject property 
being considered (R. 340, 361-364, 418-435). Th~ 
evaluation estimates of Defendant's witnesses of 
$75.00 a front foot and $.53 a square foot for the 
subject property as of March 1964, was substantially 
supported by competent evidence (R. 367, 448). 
7. State's Value Witnesses. It was the theory of the 
two appraisers for the Plaintiff that notwithstanding 
the foregoing, the highest and best use of Defend-· 
ant's property was agricultural or transitional as of 
March 1964 (R. 523, 572). It was their collective 
opinion that farming would have been the motivat-
ing force in the purchase and sale of the property, 
3The State is in error in its Brief, page 3, by the statement that the 
appraisals of the owner were based on service station site s~es on 
West Center Street. To the contrary, market value was premised on 
South University Avenue transactions, and West Center sales w~z:e 
used by General Oil witnesses to demonstrate. only the market 3;Dtlc1-
pation and influence in advance of the opemng of a freeway mter-
change on West Center. 
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commercial potential being rejected as a speculative 
use of the unforeseeable future (R. 529, 640). 
Neither appraiser reflected any value, whatsoever, 
to the commercial zoning or to the imminent influ-
ence of the freeway upon the marketability of the 
premises (R. 549-550, 639). 
Both witnesses for the Plaintiff evaluated the 
condemned property at $3,000.00 per acre (R. 505, 
598) . On cross-examination, it was revealed thait 
each witness had previously appraised substantially 
similar property at 1200 South University Avenue, 
located in the same S-3 zone, and as of the same time 
in 1964, for $10,000.00 and $12,000.00 per acre, re-
spectively (R. 556, 643). 
8. Instructions and Verdict. Instruction No. 7 of the 
Court's charge advised the jury that in determining 
the market value of the condemned property, those 
factors which affected and influenced land use and 
land value as of the time of condemnation and within 
the foreseeable future could be taken into account, 
including any enhancement ,if any, in value brought 
about by the freeway development as would have been 
reasonably foreseen as of March 1964 (R. 180). 
Plaintiff has not raised as error in this appeal the 
giving of such Instruction. 
From a jury verdict of $22,050.00, Plaintiff under-
took its appeal to this Court directly. No motion for 
new trial was filed before the lower Court. 
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9. Earlier Trial. The case was first tried before Dis-
trict Judge Maurice Harding in February 1967 (R~ 
129). From a verdict of $4,147.52, General Oil moved 
for a new trial and alternatively, for an addirtur to 
the verdict. It is not contested by Plaintiff but what 
there was substantial and competent evidence to SU'J>-
port the new trial and additur Motion. (App. Br. p. 
3, 4). The Motion was granted by Judge Harding, 
and it was ordered that an additur be entered to 
the verdict of the jury or a new trial be had if the 
additur were not accepted by the Plaintiff (R. 137). 
The State in its Brief has not referred the Court 
to any transcript citation to support the claim that 
the new trial and additur Order of Judge Harding 
lacked substantiality in the evidence of the first 
trial or that Judge Harding abused his discretion by 
the Order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
JUDGE HARDING DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE INADEQUATE 
AWARD OF DAMAGES AND OTHER ERRORS OF 
LAW. 
1. The granting of a new trial lies within the sound 
discretion of the trial judge and such order will not 
be overturned on appeal unless an abuse of discre-
tion is clearly and manifestly apparent. 
The basic claim of Plaintiff's Appeal herein is that 
District Judge Harding, in ordering a new trial because of 
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whether the verdict returned is against the clear weight 
of the evidence so as to indicate bias, prejudice or misunder-
standing, and whether the verdict represents substantial 
justice in the matter. This post-verdict function has long 
been accepted in Utah as the rightful duty and responsibility 
of the trial judge. Paul v. Kirkenda!1l, 1 U.2d 1, 261 P.2d 
670 (1953); Wellman v. Noble, 12 U.2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 
(1961). The rule is fundamental in this jurisdiction that 
the trial judge has wide discretion to grant or deny a mo-
tion for new trial and additur under Rule 59. Thus in the 
early case of Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Moyle, 4 Utah 327, 9 Pac. 
867 (1886), this Court said: 
"Motions for new trials are always addressed 
to the sound discretion of the court, and whether 
granted or denied, the discretion of the trial court 
will be presumed to have been properly exercised, 
and will be so held unless the contrary be made 
clearly to appear." 
"Wide latitude" was the description given to the trial 
Court's discretion on new trial motions in Beck v. Dutch-
rnan Coalition Mines Co. 2 U.2d 104, 269 P.2d 867 (1954). 
And in Klinge v. Southern Pacific Co. 89 Utah 284, 57 P.2d 
367 (1936), it was held that such wide discretion will not 
be lightly regarded or overturned by this Court on appeal: 
"Hence, a wide discretion is given the trial 
court in such matter and rarely is interferred with 
by an appellate tribunal whether the awarded com-
pensation by the court below was held adequate or 
inadequate." P. 297 of 89 Utah. 
In reality, the argument of Plaintiff herein reduces the 
role of the trial judge to that of a ministerial officer. It 
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the legal inadequacy of the damage award, committed pre-
judicial error entitling Plaintiff to a reversal of the Order 
and a reinstatement of the initial jury verdict. That Order 
made under Rule 59 and on motion of the Defendant, found 
and declared that the jury award of $4,147.53 was "as a 
matter 'Of law, inadequate and that good cause supports 
Defendant's Motion." (R. 137). The motion made by De-
fendant cited as grounds for new trial that the verdict was 
against the clear weight of the testimony under any reason-
able view of the evidence so as to manifest prejudice and 
misunderstanding by the jury, and was further based on 
errors of law independent of the inadequacy of the jury 
award. 
Plaintiff's argument is that the trial court's function 
is limited to the impanelment of the jury, ruling upon 
evidence and instructing upon the applicable law. So far 
as the review of the adequacy or inadequacy of a damage 
award by the jury, Plaintiff contends that the trial judge 
has no involvement. Thus, it is concluded that Judge Hard-
ing had no authority to review the verdict on just compensa-
tion or to order a new trial because of its inadequacy. 
(App. Br. p. 4). 
A fair diagnosis of such argument quickly reveals its 
error. For not only does the argument fail in the end 
result, but its very structure rests upon a misconception of 
the inherent function of the trial judge. For that function 
is not only one of an administrator during the jury trial as 
Plaintiff argues, but consists also of conducting, upon mo-
tion or sua sponte, a post-verdict review to determine 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
does nDt recognize the implicit power and discretion which 
Judge Harding possessed and exercised in granting the 
new trial motion. Plaintiff was not by such Order denied 
its right of trial by jury as possibly might be the case on 
a Judgment N.O.V. Jury trial was fully preserved to the 
parties and in fact, the ma1Jter was subsequently tried to 
and determined by a jury before Judge Elton after the 
Plaintiff refused the additur award of Judge Harding. 
2. The rule of wide discretion of the trial judge on 
new trial motion is observed in eminent domain 
1litigation. 
In the review of an eminent domain verdict to deter-
mine its legal adequacy or inadequacy, there is no break 
with the dominant rule that the trial judge maintains broad 
discretion to grant a new trial because of the inadequacy 
of the damage award. As noted in 27 Am. Jur. 2d 364, 
Sec. 448 Em. Dom., the power to order a new trial is fully 
maintained: 
"The trial court has a wide discretion in grant-
ing a new trial in a condemnation case. It is held 
that where the court is dissatisfied with the verdict 
in eminent domain proceedings, the court has not 
only the authority but also the duty to set the verdict 
aside and grant a new trial. Similarly, it is held 
to be the duty of the trial court to set aside a verdict 
in eminent domain and grant a new trial 'Where 
it appears to the court that the verdict is inadequate 
under the evidence." (Emphasis added) 
In holding that the trial judge has the responsibility 
to determine under a new trial motion, whether a con-
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dernnation verdict was a legally inadequate assessment of 
damages, the South Dakota Supreme Court stated in State 
Highway Commission v. Madsen, 119 N.W. 2d 924 (S. D. 
1963): 
"The trial judge has the primary responsibility 
for determining whether a new trial should be 
granted because of inadequate damages. In making 
that decision he is vested with a broad judicial 
discretion. Manifestly because of his participation in 
the trial he is in a far better position than are the 
judges of this court to say whether the award does 
substantial justice. Consequently we may not dis-
turb his decision except for a clear abuse of that 
discretion." 
To the same effect is Abercrombie v. Kansas Stat,e 
Highway Commission, 185 Kan. 47, 340 P.2d 377 (1959). 
This Court in Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Keller, 15 
U.2d 318, 392 P.2d 620 (1964) sustained an additur and 
new trial order of the trial Court entered because of the 
latter's findings that the severance damage verdict of the 
jury was inadequate. In so doing, this Court held firm to 
the rule that: 
"Granting or denying a new trial is largely in 
the discretion of the trial court." 
3. Judge Harding found as a matter of law, that the 
jury verdict was legally inadequate. 
The record is clear on the point that Judge Harding, 
in granting the new trial Order of which the State herein 
laments, did not simply substitute his judgment of dam-
ages for that of the jury. It was not, as the Plaintiff seems 
to contend, just a case of the trial court disagreeing with 
a jury verdict. Rather, it was the judgment of Judge 
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Harding that this verdict was, as a matter of law, against 
the manifest weight of the evidence at trial, i.e., that reason-
able minds would not differ that in light of the testimony 
adduced, the damage award of the jury was clearly inade-
quate. In such conclusion, Judge Harding came within the 
full measure of his discretion as outlined by this Court 
under the ruling law cited herein as well as within the 
framework of the recent opinion in Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 
U.2d 185, 389 P.2d 736 (1966): 
"While we agree that the trial court cannot, 
without any reason whatsoever, grant such a mo-
tion [new trial] upon mere whim or caprice, it 
nevertheless has a wide latitude of discretion with 
respect thereto in conformity with the general super-
visory powers which it necessarily has over the ver-
dicts of juries in the interest of the administration 
of justice." 
POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS WHOLLY FAILED IN THIS 
APPEAL TO DEMONSTRATE WHEREIN JUDGE 
HARDING ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN GRANT-
ING A NEW TRIAL. 
1. The presumption is in favor of the new trial Order 
and against the Plaintiff. 
While plaintiff has expressed its displeasure with the 
new trial Order of Judge Harding, it has fallen short of the 
required mark of demonstrating wherein the trial court 
manifestly or clearly abused its discretion in the matter.' 
•This Court has left no doubt in its decisions that to turn back a new 
trial order of a District Judge, the appellant has the b~rden of show· 
ing there to be a manifest or clea:r abuse .of d1scret10n. Klinge v. 
Southern Pacific Co., supra; Lehi Irrigation Compan?' v. Moyle, 
supra. "Manifest and clear" normally mi;ans that then~ is no reason· 
able basis, whatsoever, to support the rulmg. State v. Fischer, 38 N.J. 
40, 183 A.2d 11. (1962) 
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It has not referred this Court to a solitary fact that would 
reasonably form the basis for a claim of manifest and clear 
abuse. To the contrary, Plaintiff relies on the argument 
that since there was some evidence admitted in the first 
trial from which the jury might find for the Plaintiff , 
that such evidence forecloses the trial judge from finding 
the damage award to be legally inadequate. (See App. Br. 
p. 4 last para). The trouble with such argument is that it 
was rejected out of hand in Wellman v. Noble, 12 
U.2d 350, 366, P.2d 701 (1961). In sustaining the lower 
court's order of a new trial because of inadequate damages, 
this Court said therein: 
"The court did not abuse its discretion in grant-
ing a new trial. 
The trial court has a broad discretion in ruling 
on such a motion which we should not disturb unless 
there is a plain abuse thereof. * * * 
* * * The mere fact that the jury verdict is 
supported by substantial evidence sufficient to make 
a prima facie case and furnish a reasonable basis 
for their decision does not require that the trial 
court's order granting a new trial should be reversed. 
This is especially true where the order for the new 
trial is based on the amount of the verdict." 
The Court went on to say in Wellman that on the question 
of inadequacy of damages, if there was substantial evidence 
to support the motion for new trial, the trial judge will 
not be deemed to have abused his discretion: 
"This court has held in determining whether 
there has been an abuse of discretion, that where 
there is substantial evidence showing a reasonable 
basis to support a verdict in favor of the party mov-
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to damages." Paul v. Kirkendall, supra. The new trial 
Order of Judge Harding was clearly within his discretion 
under the wilderness of precedent of this Court and should 
stand affirmed. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING 
EVIDENCE ON MARKET VALUE BASED IN PART 
ON FACTORS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE IMMI-
NENT FREEWAY PROJECT. 
1. Under the Ward deC'ision in Utah, evidence of e11r 
hancement in value of the condemned property as 
well as of enhanced comparable properties is a 
proper element of consideration in determining mar-
ket value. 
Little time need be taken with Point II of Plaintiff's 
Appeal, for the issue of law raised there has been fully 
settled by the decision of this Court in Weber Basin CQn-
scrv. District v. Ward, 10 U.2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 (1949). 
Simply stated, it is Plaintiff's claim that elements of value 
which are referable to or caused by the development of the 
proposed freeway project are not admissible and are not 
compensable in fixing the market value of the subject 
property, which was condemned for the widening of an 
access-road to the freeway. Accordingly, factors in the 
market, including sales of comparable property, which have 
been influenced by the imminency of the freeway develop-
ment are not, under Plaintiff's argument, relevant on the 
compensation issue. This argument was advanced by the 
Plaintiff on several occasions before Judge Harding 
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ing for a new trial, there is no abuse of discretion 
in granting a new trial." 
That there was substantial evidence underlying the mo-
tion for new trial of General Oil in the case at bar, is not 
open for debate. Plaintiff, in fact, acknowledges substanti-
alit3'. The rationale of Wellman is dispositive of Plaintiff's 
argument and of its appeal herein. Pla:intiff cites as its only 
other authority for reversal of the Harding new trial Order, 
the decision of this Court in Lund v. Phillips Petro1leum Co.5 
That case does not at all control this Appeal, for involved 
therein was the issue of whether the trial court committed 
error in permitting a case to go to the jury and in the 
subsequent refusal of the judge to disturb the verdict. If 
Lund stands for anything in the case at hand, it upholds 
the principal of discretion of the trial judge in granting 
or denying a new trial. 
The law presumes that the new trial Order of Judge 
Harding was regular and that it was made upon proper 
foundation. As stated by this Court in Klinge v. Southern 
Pacif~c Co., supra: 
"The rule is well established that a presumption 
exists that a trial court did not err or abuse his 
discretion in granting or refusing a new trial, and 
that the burden is upon him complaining of the rul-
ing to show a clear abuse of discretion." 
The Plaintiff's burden as required by Klinge has not 
been met in this Appeal. In the absence of a clear showing 
thereof, this Court is "slow to interfere with a trial court's 
ruling granting or r~fusing a new trial on questions relating 
s 10 U.2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (1960) 
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v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369 (1942) to the effect that the value 
of property for condemnation should be determined "with-
out consideration for the fact that the condemnor plans 
improvements." In its opinion, this Court first referred to 
the Miller doctrine and then expressly rejected the same by 
holding that all factors (including enhancement of value 
from the public project) could be taken into consideration' 
by the trier of fact in determining the fair market value of 
the condemned property: 
"The basis of the attack made upon the defend-
ants' expert evidence is that they relied upon the 
increased value of the land occasioned by Weber 
Basin's plans for improvement of the area in increas-
ing farm values thereabouts. * * * The argument 
supporting such rule appears to be that the con-
demnee should not be allowed an advantage from 
the fact that the condemnor is improving the area 
and the latter be required to pay a higher price and 
thus in effect suffer a penalty because of its own 
improvements. The contrary view is that eminent 
domain statutes are designed only to give the con-
demnor the power to purchase property whether the 
condemnee desires to sell or not, but are not pur-
posed to give the condemnor any superior bargain-
ing position as to price. 
We are in accord with what appears to be the 
better view, adopted by the trial court, that the con-
demnee is entitled to the fair market value of his 
property at the time of the service of summons 
in the condemnation proceedings as provided by 
statute; and that all factors bearing upon such value 
that any prudent purchaser would take into account 
at that time should be given consideration, including 
any potential development in the area reasonably 
to be expected." 
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(including an earlier and independent case) and in th:e trial 
before Judge Elton from which Plaintiff now appeals. Both 
Judges Harding and Elton ruled against Plaintiff's argu-
ment and permitted evidence of enhancement in value from 
the freeway project, such rulings being largely made on the 
strength of the Ward decision. 
Plaintiff cites as authority for its argument an encyclo-
pedia and three cases from other jurisdictions.6 But it has 
ignored and failed to even cite in its Appeal Brief the 
plain holding of this Court in the Ward case. Indeed, 
"ignore" is a proper characterization of the Plaintiff's Brief 
herein, for the Ward decision and its rationale was fully 
researched, explored and argued by both parties before ' 
both trial Judges Harding and Elton. 
The answer to the contention made by Plaintiff was 
laid to rest in Weber Basin Conserv. District v. Ward, for 
the Court therein held, without dissent, that factors in the 
market attributable to the public project for which the 1 
property in question is condemned, may be taken into con-
sideration in determining the fair market value of the 
condemned property. In Ward as here, the condemnor 
argued that the judgment of the trial court was erroneous, 
since the testimony of the owner on market value was based 
on the increased value of the condemned Uind which the 
water project of condemnor brought about in the area. 
In so arguing, the Conservancy District relied upon U. S. 
s These citations are unauthoritative and should carry no weight with 
this Court for they all have their footings in th~ doctri:r:I'. announced 
in U. S. v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369 (1942), which declSlon was ex-
pressly rejected by this Court in Ward. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is plain that the new trial Order of Judge Harding 
is substantially supported by the record and testimony in 
the case and is presumed proper. The Plaintiff has not met 
its burden of showing such Order to be an abuse of discre-
tion whatsoever, much less making a showing of manifest 
and clear abuse. It was Judge Harding who heard the 
·witnesses, who had a first hand view of all the evidence and 
proceedings throughout the trial and who observed strategy 
of counsel and the reaction of the jury. His judgment on 
new trial matters cannot under the ruling precedent of this 
Court be overturned, it is submitted. 
The rulings of the trial court on the admissibility of 
the evidence relating to market value as enhanced by the 
imminency of the freeway project, was in full accord with 
the unequivocal holding of this Court in Weber Basin Con-
s1ru. District v. Ward. There was no error committed. 
The judgment of the trial court herein should be 
affirmed in all respects. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERTS. CAMPBELL, JR. 
STEWART M. HANSON, JR. 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
General Oil Company 
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It is apparent from the record herein that the property 
of General Oil, at the date of condemnation, had been for 
better than six years past situated in a market which was 
fairly teeming with activity and interest oriented toward 
freeway development and the South University Avenue 
Interchange. Zoning, utility services, public hearings, and 
market attitudes were all geared toward the potential and 
commercial use of the area proximately due to the im- ' 
minency of the freeway project. To have placed a veil over 1 
the trial so as to eliminate that primary factor as an ele-
ment of market value (which is what the State would have 
had us do) would have been to create a false and hypo-
thetical market which never in fact existed. The appraisal 
process, itself, under such an artificial system would become 1 
a hopeless attempt to evaluate the subject property under 
market conditions which were plainly not prevalent. The 
guiding philosophy of the Ward decision requires that the 
parties look the facts in the face and that just compensation 
be tied to the genuine realities of the extant market. 
In his charge to the jury, Judge Elton instructed in 
accordance with the Ward decision, "that all factors whfoh 
the prudent buyer and seller would take into account in-
cluding market value influence caused by the construction 
and development of any public improvement or project at 
the time or within the reasonably foreseeable future" were 
proper considerations for the jury in arriving at its verdict. 
The State has not alleged as error in this Appeal the giving 
of such Instruction. (See Instruction No. 7, R. 180). 
The rule and charge on the evidential issue were proper 
and should be affirmed. 
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